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characterize the relation between the dis
psychoanalysis and law or, rather, the relation

How may
ciplines of

one

members of the

professions?
It will not do to say simply that it is a relation of friendly
co-operation or one of hostile suspicion. Perhaps the usual
relation may fairly be called one of mutual ambivalence.
The analyst, on the one hand, regards the maintenance of
a system of law and justice as a necessary condition for
personal. equilibrium. On the other hand, he regards
much of the law as antiquated and outworn and often

between

representative

criticizes it

based

as

on

theological

two

vation which

has contributed. At other

psychoanalysis

lawyers show hostile defensiveness in
analysts' sweeping criticisms of the law.
Psychoanalysts have sometimes spoken
times

terms
ness.

which

seem

Thus in

a

calculated

book which

may take

we

the face of the

of the law in

increase this defensive

to

representative

as

psychoanalytic tradition, Dr. Franz Alexander be
one chapter with a brisk resolution boldly to "enter
gins
the Augean stables of philosophy of law and attempt to
make a psychological analysis of the concept of responsi
of the

bility."!
As this

cept of

quotation suggests, the principal focus of
and law is the

psychoanalysis

general

ten
con

tradition asserts, or at least
have some measure of free choice.

responsibility. Legal

assumes, that most

Psychoanalysis,

on

men

(to quote Alexander
psychic apparatus as a sys

the other hand

"considers the human

fully, and without a single gap, determined
by psychological and biological causative factors."2 He
adds his diagnosis that the concept of free will is an illu
tem

to the concept of responsibility.
In the 1920's Dr. Alexander worked closely with

lems related

Staub.

They
lawyer, Hugo
published in this country in 1931

lin criminal
which

was

wrote

a

Ber

book

a

under the

and the Public-a

Psycho
Judge,
logical Analysis. This book is still one of the most pene
trating interpretations of criminal behavior. In the next
title The Criminal, the

few pages I shall attempt a highly condensed summary of
this analysis, realizing, of course, that I can hardly expect
to

avoid

inaccuracy.
is

Criminality

not a

congenital defect;

it results from

development. We all
criminality. (The au

it shows arrested

defective

training;
a period

go through
thors invite

us to

of infantile

what the world would be like

imagine

predominance of power were in the hands of children
under ten.) A majority of children learn not to be crimi

if

through the experience of punishment-punishment
physical world itself and from parents (and
others) through the infliction of pain or the apparent
nals

from the

withdrawal of love. This

experience

of the demands of

reality leads to repression of part of the basic drives and
to the discovery of socially acceptable outlets for the re
mainder. The result is

an

unstable

equilibrium,

"a

sort

of

between the powers which restrict our instinc
tual expression and the instinctual demands of the indi
vidual." Criminal behavior results from the blocking of
a contract

sion between

again),

(It is not recorded that analysts were thrown into a panic
by this pronouncement.)
A general treatment of the relation of psychoanalysis
and law would have to deal with many points of contact.
In this paper, however, I shall consider only certain prob

and moral ideas which

have survived their usefulness. From their side, the men
of law sometimes welcome the insights into human moti
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which is

sion-"an

expression of the

postulate

of the moralists that the

wish,

narcissistic

should rule, supreme and unlimited
ratus of man

or

even

the

Super-Ego does or
in the psychic appa

this process

or

from the

precarious

nature

of this

equilib

num.

principal categories of
psychotics and defectives
in whom criminal acts are traceable to organic degenera
tion or failure of organic development. The second cate
Alexander

distinguishes

four

criminals. The first consists of

third he calls
gory is that of "neurotic criminals." The
"normal criminals," professional criminals without psy
chological conflict. These three categories are those of
"chronic" criminals. The fourth includes those who have

"

committed crimes

....

Ten years ago an American Bar Association committee
warned that careful consideration must be given to the

spread

of Freudian doctrine.

So far

as

your committee

can

discover,

the doctrines of

tend toward determinism; free will does not
exist but human conduct is or may be determined
by long
3
past events in the life of the individual.

psychoanalysis

...

...

The committee added
Unless there is
and

exploitation

called
an

a

of

on sooner or

of

vague threat:

reversal in the trend of the

psychoanalysis
later

established science

testimony

a

or

to

,

the

determine whether
to

art

psychoanalysts

...

.

justify

development

C?u:ts

w,ill

be

It IS or IS not

because of

a

general criminal

categories

of crime

are

tend

an acute

sit

distinguished

ac

of
ency but because of the external pressure
uation.
These four

...

not

cording
degree and character of the ego participa
tion which they involve. In the case of psychotics and
defectives, ego participation is entirely absent. Among
neurotic criminals, however, there is variety in the degree
to

the

and mode of ego participation. One must distinguish
those with specific neurotic symptom patterns from those
with general neurotic characters. Persons with specific
neurotic symptoms enact and re-enact an unconscious
drama of crime and self-inflicted punishment. Klepto-

the admission of
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afford illustrations of such

characters, however, the
of the

tion and

usually

no awareness

only

not

are

or

faced

rationaliza

psychoanalysis

can

one

of

(professional) criminals, Alex

Super-Ego"; the criminal is with
conflict, but his adj ustment is to the
community.

leased from the

In his conduct

full ego participation. The same is true
"situational" criminal; here the circum

painful that the individual feels re
"bargain" which normally keeps his be

are

could

he did. The notion of

acting
entirely inadmissible.
penalties are viewed as imposed
as

havior of the criminals
the

so

Alexander and Staub's

of both

case

ishment will
ters

covers not

only

the

con

not

are

deterred

not

by

is that of desire for

the

more

significant

is the in

normally law-abiding citizen.
The example of the criminal has a stimulating effect
our own
repressed impulses, and increases the pressure
4
them
from
ing
the

professional

They

acts

are

therefore

are

punishment.

"punishment

more or

by ego participation.
less deterable. As to the acute

however, Alexander

safe in

more

to

be isolated,

on

....

expiated

one's

own

equilibrium,
and the

repre

Ego against

drives; the Ego puts itself at the service
repressing forces, in order to retain the state of

instinctual

of the inner

which

repressing

must

always exist between
personality.P

the

repressed

forces of the

In both of these ways the demand that crime be pun
must be added, however, that the

ished is defensive. It

demand may also represent
and aggressiveness.

an

outbreak of basic hatred

analysts might charge Dr. Alexander with over
simplification and might question his four categories. For
our
purposes, however, we may take the foregoing as a
typical psychoanalytic view of the behavior of criminals
Other

and of the social reaction

to

such behavior. What does

the purposes of the criminal law ?
imply
It implies, in the first place, that the criminal law is
exclusively forward-looking. Penalties should be imposed

such

only

a

view

in order

as to

to

influence behavior-either the future be

or the behavior of others
for whom his punishment serves as an example. The
criminal law should in no sense be retributory. The crim-

havior of the criminal himself

made

or

some

important, from the viewpoint of psycho

justification of
Alexander, "the majority

is the deterrence of others

people

that

other way, throughout the course of
which they remain a menace to soci

socially
the period during
ety.?"

social

states

is superfluous." He is skeptical as to the
punishment upon professional criminals,

but he insists that these "will have

of

classes,

...

effect of actual

analysis,

two

characterized

"situational" crime,

or

The other

as

a

resist

behavior,

According

some

not

of their

to

own

tendencies toward anti

because of moral
....

laws which

qualms, but because
forbidding the
...

are

almost

without po

man, in

general, obeys
only
supervision."? In the words of Dr. Ranyard West,
"In our law-making it is our own control which we are
planning rather than that of others.:" From this view
point the criminal law is an outstanding success.
This summary of the psychoanalytic view of the func
tion of the criminal law suggests that a working agree
ment is possible between the lawyer and the analyst, not
withstanding their apparent disagreement as to retribu
tion and free will. They should, be able to agree that in
dividuals who are in general deterable (those in whose
conduct a high degree of ego participation is manifested)
are to be held responsible as if their acts sprang from free
choice. As to the mentally ill, neurotic criminals as well
as
psychotics, it is inappropriate to treat them in the same
the

lice

com

The demand that every crime should be
sents, then, a defense reaction on the part of the

the threat of

and the "situational" criminals, consist of

The laws
of fear of real consequences
murder of parents, incest and cannibalism

even

implica

and neurotic

the criminal presents. The threat is twofold. Externally,
of course, crime is' a threat to safety and order and is met
defensive force. But

the

criminals, pun
have the desired effect. In such charac

psychotic

criminal conduct is

Much

analysis

themselves,

the criminal law.

to

ret

influence the be

to

what

duct of criminals but also the social demand for their
punishment. In the first place, the demand for punish
ment is seen as a defensive reaction to the threat which

ternal threat

or

punishment. In many cases, in fact, the threat of punish
ment is an inducement, since the unconscious motivation

havior within the law.

by

have

not

expiation

tions of the classification of criminals outlined above? In

those whose

law-breaking
there is relatively
acute

as

unconscious motivation is

section of the

stances

subjective

mean

"criminal

a

unconscious

of the

conduct,

overt

typically involved. This category
law-abiding eccentrics but also a

of normal

case

ander finds
out

of the

many
of criminals. Often

large proportion
reveal clearly that the
seeking punishment.
In the

the

conduct, and mechanisms such

projection

includes

assents to

ego

If

neu

rotic symptoms. Here the action is compulsive; ego par
ticipation is almost zero. In the case of general neurotic

ing

he

fully determined;

was

ribution is

pyromania

but there is

act

avoided
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fashion-and it is unnecessary in order to maintain the
general deterrent force of the law. To the extent that
"normal" citizens

cally different,

that such persons are psychologi
being treated as sick rather than as

sense

their

criminals should accord with the

sense

of

justice.

This

assumes, of course, that dangerous persons who are thus
held irresponsible will be segregated with such opportu
nity for therapy as the state can make available.

For
ment

lawyers acceptance of this working agree
relatively easy. Some lawyers take a de
view of human conduct and regard punishment

some

should be

terminist

16

The Law School Record

mere use

as a

of the criminal

Justice Holmes
If I

were

wrote

in

a

to

letter

deter others. Thus .Mr.
Laski:

to

having a philosophical talk with a
hanged (or electrocuted) I should

man

I

was

have

going
say, I don't
doubt that your act was inevitable for you but to make it
more avoidable
by others we propose to sacrifice you to the
to

good. You may regard yourself as
for your country if you like. But the law

common

soldier

a

dying
keep its

must

promises.P

general, however, lawyers have balked at any such
working agreement with psychiatrists. The typical law
yer, like the typical citizen, assumes that legal responsi
bility is related to moral responsibility and that moral
responsibility presupposes freedom of choice. Judges and
legislators (at least in Anglo-American countries) have
hesitated to follow the lead of psychiatrists in defining
the class of the irresponsible. For over a century they have
insisted on a test of responsibility which most analysts and
other psychiatrists regard as untenable and unworkable.
This is the traditional "right and wrong" test (the
M'Naghten test named for the celebrated English mur
out

case

of which it

under which evi

originated),

dence of mental illness may be considered only if it es
tablishes that the accused was unable to understand the
moral

of his

nature

act.

and others have

Psychoanalysts

criticized this formula because it

repeatedly
responsible

holds

and who

act

their conduct
In

some

increased

many criminals who

compulsively despite
is "wrong."

American

states

by recognition

of

are

acute

an

the class of
an

apparently
seriously ill
that

sense

irresponsibles is
impulse" de

"irresistible

fense. In many states, however, judges have refused to
adopt this rule. Nor are they likely to be won over by the

psychoanalyst who argues that "every tenet of modern
psychiatry points toward the acceptance of the 'irresistible
impulse' plea" and at the same time insists that "modern
regards all criminal acts as products of ab
psychiatry
normal personality structure and development.'?" This,
in an article labeling free will an illusion, seems to sug
gest that impulses which were not in fact resisted were
necessarily irresistible, a notion which can hardly be 111corporated into the criminal law.
...

Psychoanalysts
sisted that the

responsibility
British

cently
a

and

should be

Institute of

psychiatrists have long in
wrong" approach to criminal
abandoned. For example, the

Psycho-Analysis

that the law should hold

person

did

and other

"right

suffering

not

recommended

re

criminally responsible

from "disorder of emotion such that he

possess sufficient power to prevent himself from
committing the act."ll In the United States a similar rec
not

ommendation has been made

Psychiatry,

vancement

of

influential

psychoanalysts.

an

for the Ad

the

by
Group
organization which

includes

This recommendation is sim

ply that "no person shall be convicted
time he committed the act
he was

...

...

mental illness." Mental illness is defined

when

suffering
as

at

the

from

"an illness

lessens the

his
capacity of the person to use
discretion
and
control
in
the
conduct
of
his
af
judgment,
fairs and social relations as to warrant his commitment to
so

...

mental institution.t'l''

a

In July, 1954, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia reviewed these recommendations and, without
the aid of statute, adopted a new test: Did the defendant's

from mental illness

act stem

of

In

der

which
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involved,

taches and criminal

responsibility

if the

to

is traceable

act

moral blame does

This

achieve

reducing

substantial.

are

ex

at

imposed;

not

not

be

to

imposed,

free
be

attach.

raises 'anew the basic tension between

reasoning

possibilities
ities

argued

moral blame

mental illness rather than

the traditions of law and
of

it the result

is therefore

choice, criminal responsibility should
cause

or was

Bazelon

Judge

if free choice is

plicitly that,

defect,

or

exercise of free will ?13

an

What

psychoanalysis.

this tension? I think the
and

Lawyers

are

the

possibil

psychoanalysts

can

only working agreement but also common
to the nature of man and common
acceptance

not

a

insight as
paradox or mystery of his freedom.
In the first place, not all psychoanalysts and analytically
oriented psychiatrists are dogmatic in their total rejection
of free choice. The following quotation is from Dr. Stan
ley A. Leavey, of the Yale School of Medicine:
of the

Insofar

as

we

approach

with

but

the

subject inductively we come
view; causality is even

deterministic

nothing
reign within the moral life as it does elsewhere
[But] only a prejudice would make us deny the reality of all
our choices. A scientific statement of the matter at this
point
seems to me to be this: that we
really have moral choices,
out

seen

to

....

and that when
and these
the

examine them, we find their determinants,
clauses are not reducible to one another, i.e.,
of causality in human experience does not ex
we

two

discovery

haust its

meaning.l"

Another
P.

a

analyst

Knight,

who may be cited here is Dr. Robert

whose address

and

Psychotherapy"?"
ation warning already

on

was a

"Determinism, 'Freedom,'

direct

referred

to.

reply

the bar associ

to

In this address he dis

cussed the

necessity of effort on the part of a patient un
dergoing psychotherapy. If therapy is to be successful,
must the
patient exert effort and, if so, is the exertion
fully explained by tracing its appearance to existing char
acter traits and to the new determinants
brought to bear
by the therapist? Dr. Knight took a thoroughgoing de
terminist position and yet insisted upon the necessity of
effort. After
wrote to

Dr.

puzzling over this address for some
Knight, asking whether there is not

time, I
a

para
dox between determinism and the notion of "effort"

which

patients (and

everyone

else)

must

had laid

make in order

responsibility. (I
wager with one of
Dr.
would
that
the existence
admit
my colleagues
Knight
of paradox.) He replied as follows:
to

grow in

Yes, I puzzled quite
terminism

vs.

"effort,"

satisfaction. One

can

a

bit

over

and have

the

a

paradox

of

psychic

de

yet reconciled it to my
say that the effort itself is also deternot
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A

general

view

Hilton Hotel

of

of

the luncheon

during

the annual

University of Chicago

'meeting held at the Conrad
meeting of the Associati�n

American Law Schools.
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Bigelow

17

Fellow Alan Mewett, Ralph Kh aras '27, Dean of
of Law at Syracuse University, Assistant Dean

the School

10 Lucas, and Bigelow

Fellow Robert

Stoyles,

at

the AALS

luncheon.

'52, Professor Max Rheinstcin, and
fohn Hazard, ISD'39, professor of public law at Columbia
University, on the occasion of the luncheon held by The
Law School at the annual meeting of the Association of

Lawrence Friedman,

Maurice Van

Heeke, '17, president of

the Association

of

American Law Schools, Justice Walter V. Schaefer, '28, of
the Illinois Supreme Court, and Robert Mathews of Ohio
State

University,

at

the AALS luncheon.

American Law Schools.

mined-which
or one can

seems

to

concede that,

something of a tour de
especially in psychotherapy,
be

force
one ex

pects and mobilizes more effort than the amount which is
yet "determined" by previous experience. Such factors as

(in therapy), inspirational influences, and con
or of one's
completed work, projected
ceptions
into the future, may be regarded as determining factors, but
I still, at this stage of my thinking at least, feel that there is
calls it a
something left over. Harry Emerson Fosdick
win
think
I
to life
your
you
experience.
"personal rejoinder"
transference

of one's self

One may even find a psychoanalyst saying a good word
for the idea of retribution and for traditional ideas of

morality. Dr. Robert Waelder, a graduate of the Vienna
Psychoanalytic Institute, has asserted that everyone, with
exception,
lation of law;

out

retribution

...

bet.

criminal is

believes that retribution should follow vio

explains that the apparent opponents of
merely hold that someone other than the
guilty of his act-"society," "the ruling class,"
he

etc.!" Dr. Waelder has also written:
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The

complete elimination of the concept of retribution
legal system may not be without danger. It would
tend to dissociate the law entirely from moral sentiment. If
the law no longer must conform, by and large, to moral
standards, utilitarianism or expediency becomes the only
guide. The emancipation from traditional moral sentiments,
begun at first for humanitarian purposes, may eventually
have consequences not so humanitarian. Once everything can
be done that appears to be socially useful, i.e., that is so con
sidered by those who have authority to define social useful
ness, a course has been charted that may well end in despot
from the

ism. Liberal

in its humanitarian distaste for the

positivism,

harsher aspects of traditional morality, may, by undermining
the authority of traditional morality, become the pathbreaker
of

more

to me to

severity

ruthless

The humanitarian

seems
goal
the
of
mitigation
by
progressive
rather than by an attempt to eliminate

successors.

be better served

of retribution

the retributive aspect

...

the

altogetherP

Psychoanalysis is gradually developing a distinctive eth
theory. It has its own conception of "the good," the
objective of healthy personality development. The vary
ing formulations use terms such as "maturity," "sponta
neity," "productiveness," "inner freedom," "responsibili
ty," "capacity to love." Furthermore, some analysts, as we
have seen, are willing to concede that men have a degree
ical

of freedom

to move or not to move

in the direction of

this

goal. To be sure, this is no power to lift one's self
by his bootstraps. Progress toward maturity comes about
only with external help-help which ordinary experience
affords or help made available in psychotherapy. Man's
real freedom of choice is a freedom to accept or reject
such help, a freedom to choose among potential determi
of one's conduct.

nants

of

help means the acceptance of painful
self-knowledge (as well as other frustrations); it means
also the resisting of self-protective reaction tendencies.
This is the basic requirement for advance in maturity.
Acceptance

In the words of Dr. Ernest

Jones, the English editor of

Freud:

psychological problem of normality must ultimately
reside in the capacity to endure-in the ability to hold wishes
in suspension without either renouncing them or "reacting"
them in defensive ways. Freedom and self-control are thus
seen to be
really the same thing, though both are badly mis
to

concepts.l"

Of

In the

course one

seldom finds

duty, but even
following passage:
Freud remarked
even

once

for his

of

psychoanalysts speaking

Dr. Alexander

comes

close in the

one

may

postulate

dreams, i.e., for his

wishes. When asked whether

we

must

bear

that

man

is

unconscious

responsibility

for

pages are fragmentary materials for a
ethics. Can such a position be satisfactory
He has

affirmed

usually

freedom of

a

choice far wider than that which any analyst is willing
to recognize. Can he admit that this wider freedom is a
fiction? He may have heard of the
"20
and he may recall that careful
if,'

of 'as

"philosophy
judges have

some

spoken of free will as only an assumption. Thus
Mr. Justice Jackson:
How far one by an exercise of free will may determine his
general destiny or his course in a particular matter and how
far he is the toy of circumstance has been debated through
the ages by theologians, philosophers, and scientists. What
times

ever doubts
they have entertained as to the matter, the prac
tical business of government and administration of the law
is obliged to proceed on more or less rough and ready judg

based

ments

the

on

assumption

in control of their

sons are

that

own

mature

and rational per

conduct.P

What may trouble the lawyer is the realization that legal
responsibility is thus revealed as largely vicarious respon
To be sure, the law has had its

sibility.

without

bility
for

fault; employers

are

categories of lia
vicariously responsible

of their

employees. But it is usually assumed that
liability are exceptional and require spe
cial justification. And it is also believed that in criminal
law vicarious liability is even more strictly limited. Now
the lawyer is told that the typical liability for "fault,"
criminal as well as civil, is largely vicarious, since it is lia
bility for consequences of the acts of others who have
acts

such instances of

molded the defendant's character and determined his
conduct.
If the

lawyer explores

this view of

responsibility,

may discover that it is by no means novel. It is
theme in the Judeo-Christian tradition of moral
In this tradition there is

if

impairment of
recognizes the extent to

one

no

character and therefore one's

acts are

of the determinants of those

gardless
this responsibility,
to

key

to

are

acts.

he

central

theology.

the

sense

of

which one's

by

called

for themselves and for their

responsibility

sume

a

determined

of one's forebears and others. Men

acts

God

the

to as

acts

re

imposes

and his grace makes it possible for
shoulder it, to make something of himself. The

personality development is the acceptance of this
responsibiilty-in Christian terms it is partici

vicarious

pation
that

it pos

foregoing

psychoanalytic
to the lawyer?

man

moral

responsible

responsibility for the unconscious because he made
man to
gain the upper hand over [it].19

sible for

responsibility

The

used

the
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in the

Sir Walter
It may be

greater

atoning

life of the Savior. In the words of

Moberly:
[that

than

it

is] by

the acceptance of a moral liability
be due that moral advance is

appears

to

forced

widen

dreams, Freud answered: "Who else can take over this
responsibility?" After all, an individual is closer to his own

made

unconscious than anyone else
Psychoanalysis makes it possible for the individual

appears simply a liability arising out of a
power. It may also be a power arising out of a voluntary,
and apparently quixotic, embracing of a liability that could

our

the scope of power of his conscious Ego.
founder of psychoanalysis has thus a right to impose

crease

.

.

...

ity.

....

to
.

in

The

on

us

....

It

we

no

have been

are

longer

disputed.F

to

our

conception

of

responsibil

The

5, No.2

Vol.

It is

not

essential, of

that the

course,

University of Chicago
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Law School

and the

lawyer

psychoanalyst reach agreement on metaphysical terms in
which to couch the mystery of human freedom. If only
they mutually acknowledge the existence of the mystery,
they can join wholeheartedly in a working agreement.
They can agree that the purposes of the criminal law are
forward-looking, that the legal process is impotent to un
cover and adjudicate man's real freedom and responsi
bility. The law must summon men to full responsibility
and to this end must treat most men as if they were fully
responsible. (In this sense only is legal justice retribu
tive.) Legal liability is both necessary and helpful in en
abling men to increase in self-control. But it is only the
relatively healthy whom it is appropriate to treat in this
manner. The
drawing of the line will remain a difficult
task. And it will be unfortunate and unnecessary if mu
tual distrust keeps lawyers and psychiatrists from co-oper
ative attack upon this

problem.
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